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familiar with Homer, but also remain tied to the
lifesaving mast of the cross (Ad adolescentes 4.10–11).
For Basil, truth is the decisive criterion by which
the values of the Homeric narratives should be
judged. Plato had handled Homer’s epics similarly
(Resp. 2.376c–398b; 10.595a–608b). Consequently,
Alexandrian interpreters found in allegory a
method by which to understand the myths as veiled
expressions of deeper meaning. This method, first
tested on Homer, led some Christians to understand the parables of Jesus also as carriers of veiled
truths that the interpreter could then translate out
of the Jewish tradition and into Christian thought
(cf. Niehoff 2011 and 2012 on the reception of this
method by Philo of Alexandria).
Based on the importance of Homer as a school
textbook and as the core of general education in
the Greco-Roman world, some have asked whether
Homer had any influence on the authors of the NT.
Quotations that would offer clear indication of
knowledge of Homer in the NT are missing (Bartelink: 126), and the first verbatim reference to Homer is not found until Justin Martyr (1 Apol. 18.5).
Advocates of “Mimesis Criticism” argue for more
extensive comparison with Homeric texts, claiming
that NT narrative texts owe more to Homer than to
historical events. Extensive lists of alleged parallels
form the backbone of this discussion. The relevant
passages present Jesus as exceeding the Homeric heroes in significance (transvaluation). Dennis R. MacDonald reads the Acts of Andrew essentially as a
Christian Odyssey (2003). Mark’s passion narrative,
too supposedly follows the wandering and testing
of Odysseus by employing the plot pattern of the
righteous one wrongly persecuted (Od. 1.45–79;
Auffarth 1991: 378). “Mimesis Criticism” has been
challenged for its loose parallels and also for neglecting the role of the OT in early Christian text
composition.
Nevertheless, even if direct quotations are lacking, a Greek education influenced by Homer can
still be presumed for educated Hellenistic authors
like Paul and Luke. Homeric phraseology is most
likely found in Acts 27 : 41. When Paul characterizes himself as one who has “become all things to
all people” (1 Cor 9 : 22 τος πσιν γ γονα πντα),
he is not far from the characterization of Odysseus
as πολτροπος (in any case, Gregory of Nazianzus
sees the connection, Carmina 2.728–30). The anthropomorphic god who visits the people in Acts
14 : 8–18 is only made comprehensible by scenes
from Homer. Further, Paul must have learned the
γυμνς κκκος (1 Cor 15 : 37) of the Homeric Hymn to
Demeter from his Corinthian converts.
Eudocia’s Homeric Centones (4th cent. CE) is a
full-fledged example of Jesus stories set in Homeric
hexameter. Lines from the epics are stitched together to form a new text, a Homeric gospel. With
regard to content, they are Jesus stories, while Ho-
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mer provides the words, style and rhythm in this
extreme example of intertextuality. Nonnus of Panopolis (5th cent. CE), the author of the Dionysiaca,
a monumental epic of forty-eight books (thus just
as many as Homer’s Odyssey and Iliad together), is
also the author of a Paraphrase of the Gospel of John
(μεταβολ το κατ Ιωννην εαγγελου γου) in
epic hexameter.
Bibliography: ■ Auffarth, C., Der drohende Untergang: ”Schöpfung” in Mythos und Ritual im Alten Orient und in Griechenland
am Beispiel der Odyssee und des Ezechielbuches (RVV 39; Berlin/
New York 1991). ■ Auffarth, C., “Das Korn der Sterblichkeit: Was Paulus von seinen Korinthern im Demeter- und
Kore-Heiligtum gelernt hat,” in Bestattungsrituale und Totenkult in der römischen Kaiserzeit: Rites funéraires et culte des morts
aux temps impériales (ed. J. Rüpke/J. Scheid; Potsdamer Altertumswissenschaftliche Beiträge 27; Stuttgart 2009) 113–33.
■ Bartelink, G., “Homer,” RAC 16 (Stuttgart 1994) 116–47.
■ Glockmann, G., Homer in der frühchristlichen Literatur bis Justinus (TU 105; Berlin 1968). ■ Gnilka, C., ΧΡΗΣΙΣ: Die Methode der Kirchenväter im Umgang mit der Antiken Kultur (Basel
1984). ■ MacDonald, D. R., The Homeric Epics and the Gospel
of Mark (New Haven, Conn. 2000). ■ MacDonald, D. R.,
Does the New Testament Imitate Homer? Four Cases from the Acts
of the Apostles (New Haven, Conn. 2003). ■ Niehoff, M. R.,
Jewish Exegesis and Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria (Cambridge 2011). ■ Niehoff, M. R. (ed.), Homer and the Bible in
the Eyes of Ancient Interpreters (Leiden 2012). ■ Sandnes, K.
O., “Imitatio Homeri? An Appraisal of Dennis R. MacDonald’s ‘Mimesis Criticism,’” JBL 124 (2005) 715–32.
■ Sandnes, K. O., The Challenge of Homer: School, Pagan Poets
and Early Christianity (LNTS 400; London/New York 2009).
■ Sandnes, K. O., The Gospel ‘According to Homer and Virgil’:
Cento and Canon (NT.S 138; Leiden 2011).

Christoph Auffarth and Karl Olav Sandnes
See also /Allegory
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I. Ancient Near East and Hebrew Bible/
Old Testament
Homicide, the unlawful killing of a human being,
is addressed in biblical texts in a number of legal
passages (Exod 21 : 12–14; Num 35 : 9–34; Deut
19 : 1–13) and in the Decalogue (Exod 20 : 13; Deut
5 : 17) and is featured is several narratives, principally Cain and Abel (Gen 4 : 1–16), the flood story
(Gen 9 : 5–6), the Joseph novella (Gen 37 : 18–22),
and David and Bathsheba (2 Kgs 11–12). It is unclear whether the legal texts reflect actual law or
were supposed to have legislative effect.
While all three passages in the legal corpora of
the Bible agree on a distinction between intentional
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and accidental killing, they offer differing criteria
for determining whether a slaying was intentional
or accidental.(Exod 21 : 12–14; Num 35 : 9–34; Deut
19 : 1–13). In fact, Num 35 contains two conflicting
sets of criteria: one set of criteria bases the distinction on the type of instrument used to cause the
fatal blow (Num 35 : 16–18), while the other set depends on determining the state of mind of the killer
(Num 35 : 20–23). The first set holds that any kind
of iron tool and only the types of wooden or stone
tools sufficient to cause death are considered a satisfactory indication of whether the killer acted with
intention. The second set holds that it must be determined whether the blow was done in hatred.
Deuteronomy 19 : 4–5; 11–12 offers different criteria: it determines that a killing was intentional
based on whether there was a hostile relationship in
the past between the victim and the killer. Exodus
21 : 14 understands accidental homicide as an act
caused by God rather than a human being.
The remedy for homicide operated via blood
feud. A member of the victim’s family, gō‘ēl ha-dām,
meaning “the blood redeemer” but often translated
as “blood avenger,” had the right and the responsibility to kill the slayer with impunity. The only legal way a slayer could claim that a homicide was
accidental was to flee and seek refuge at a place of
refuge: this put a hold on the right of the blood
avenger to kill the slayer on sight and served to initiate a trial to determine whether the slayer did indeed kill accidentally. Left unmentioned was how
the blood avenger would be able to identify the killer if there were no witnesses to the killing or if the
witnesses gave conflicting testimony. Both Num 35
and Deut 19 depict a process of adjudication in
which a national (or perhaps a local) assembly
(Num) or elders from the killer’s hometown (Deut)
served as judges.
Bloodguilt devolved on both the intentional
and accidental slayer due to the defiling aspects of
the unlawfully spilled blood. Ritual impurity was
incurred when the homicide occurs, since the blood
itself was a defiling substance, but since blood was
also a purifying substance, the slaying of the intentional killer removed the impurity. In the case of
the accidental killer, he remained in the city of refuge until the death of the high priest, an Israelite
who served as a symbol for the Israelites before God
and whose death expiated the accidental killer
(Greenberg). Ethical impurity was also incurred
when a homicide takes place (Klawans). The Israelites were duly warned that an unpunished killing
would defile them and/or the Land of Israel. The
town that lay closest to the spot at which a murdered corpse was found was required to perform a
ceremony to remove the impurity of the spilled
blood (Deut 21 : 1–9).
Debate has arisen with regard to the development of the places of refuge. A number of scholars
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have argued that the institution of asylum originated in the sanctity associated with an altar, a
sanctity that protected those who sought asylum
from harm (Löhr; Nicolsky). Some of the narratives
depicting altar asylum specify that the refugees
held onto the horns of the altar (1 Kgs 1 : 49–53;
2 : 28–34). A number of the towns associated with
the Levites, distinguished from other Levites for
their special duties in the sacred realm, became
towns of refuge, an extension of altar asylum. However, it is questionable as to why a killer, impure
from the spilling of blood, whether intentional or
accidental, would be allowed to touch an altar or
even be allowed near a sacred object like an altar
(Barmash: 78–85). Furthermore, the narratives that
depict those seeking refuge at an altar or sacred site
do not identify them as killers but as political refugees (Barmash: 72–74).
Three specific cases are mentioned in the Bible,
the master killing his own slave (Exod 21 : 20–21),
the pregnant woman assaulted (Exod 21 : 22–25),
and the goring ox (Exod 21 : 28–36). The latter two
are mentioned in ancient Near Eastern law outside
the Bible, but the former is not since the other ancient Near Eastern statutes deal only with assault
on another person’s slave (Westbrook). The laws on
the assault on the pregnant woman have presented
interpretive difficulties for millennia since it is not
clear whether they deal with premature birth, miscarriage, or the death of the pregnant woman and
whether the penalty is to be decided by the husband
or others. In this passage and in Lev 24 : 17–22, lex
talionis appears. It expresses the principle of equivalence in penalty between the assault and the punishment for the assault (Frymer-Kensky). Legal and
cultural norms determine whether the equivalence
is expressed in the same injury as inflicted or in
the same degree of severity (Barmash). The death
penalty for the ox who has fatally gored a human
being has been explained by Moshe Greenberg as
due to the objective guilt of the ox: even though
the ox does not have cognizance, the ox is deemed
responsible because of the absolute value of the human life that was ended. Jacob J. Finkelstein explained that the ox is subject to stoning because its
act has violated the biblical hierarchy in which
there is an absolute distinction between human beings and animals.
The laws on homicide elsewhere in the ANE are
not as comprehensive as the laws in the Bible. Homicide appears in a single statute in the Laws of UrNammu (statute 1) but does not appear in the extant Laws of Lipit-Ishtar. The Laws of Hammurapi
presents the case of a false accusation of homicide
in a series of laws dealing with legal procedures
(statute 1). The case of the pregnant woman assaulted appears in the Laws of Lipit-Ishtar d-f, a Sumerian Laws Exercise Tablet 1–2, and the Laws of
Hammurabi 209–14, and the penalty is differenti-
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ated based on the status of the woman, whether free
or slave, and on whether the assault was intentional
or accidental. The case of the goring ox appears in
the Laws of Eshnunna (statutes 53–55) and the
Laws of Hammurapi (statutes 250–52), but the
Laws of Eshnunna extend beyond the goring ox to
include the vicious dog and the tottering wall (statutes 56–58). Cases of homicide also appear in legal
documents from the ANE outside of ancient Israel,
reflecting the central role of the king and government in adjudicating homicide, with the partial exception of the legal documents from Neo-Assyria
(Roth 1987). Except for the Hittite Laws and biblical law, there is a general lack of concern with issues
of impurity in the adjudication of homicide (Barmash).
The relationship of biblical law to the law elsewhere in the ancient Near East has been the subject
of debate. Westbrook argued that there was a single
common law throughout the ANE and that even if
a specific law mentioned only one kind of penalty
for a fatal assault, either compensation or capital
punishment, both penalties were in force. Others
have argued for a more nuanced relationship (Barmash; Otto).
Bibliography: ■ Barmash, P., Homicide in the Biblical World
(Cambridge 2005). ■ Finkelstein, J. J., The Ox that Gored
(TAPhS 71/2; Philadelphia, Pa. 1981). ■ Frymer-Kensky, T.,
“Tit for Tat: The Principle of Equal Retribution in Near
Eastern and Biblical Law,” BA 49 (1980) 230–34. ■ Greenberg, M., “Some Postulates of Biblical Criminal Law,” in Yehezkel Kaufmann Jubilee Volume (ed. M. Haran; Jerusalem
1960) 5–28. ■ Greenberg, M., “More Reflections on Biblical Criminal Law,” in Studies in Bible (ed. S. Japhet; ScrHier
31; Jerusalem 1986). ■ Jackson, B. S., Essays on Comparative
Jewish and Legal History (SJLA; Leiden 1975). [Esp. 29–33]
■ Jackson, B. S., Wisdom-laws: A Study of the Mishpatim of Exodus 21 : 1–22 : 16 (Oxford 2006). ■ Klawans, J., Impurity and
Sin in Ancient Judaism (Oxford 2000). ■ Löhr, M., Die Asylwesen im Alten Testament (Halle 1930). ■ Nicolsky, N. M.,
“Das Asylrecht in Israel,” ZAW 48 (1930) 146–75. ■ Otto,
E., Wandel der Rechtsbegründungen in der Gesellschaftgeschichte
des Antiken Israel: Eine Rechtsgeschichte des “Bundesbuches” Ex XX
22–XXIII 13 (StudBib 3; Leiden 1988). ■ Roth, M., “Homicide in the Neo-Assyrian Period,” in Language, Literature, and
History, FS E. Reiner (ed. F. Rochberg-Halton; AOS 67; New
Haven, Conn. 1987) 351–65. ■ Roth, M., Law Collections
from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor (SBLWAW; Atlanta, Ga.
2
1995). ■ Westbrook, R., Studies in Biblical and Cuneiform
Law (CahRB; Paris 1988).

Pamela Barmash

II. New Testament
In the NT depriving a person of life by illegally and
intentionally killing them is primarily referred to
by the verb φονεω (kill, murder) and the cognate
noun φνος (killing, murder). While both words at
times have a metaphorical meaning (e.g., the exploitation of someone), actual homicides may in
turn be figuratively referred to by the idioms of the
pouring out of blood (Matt 23 : 30; 23 : 35; Rom
3 : 15) or death by the sword (Heb 11 : 37). In the

Encyclopedia of the Bible and Its Reception vol. 12
© Walter de Gruyter, Berlin/Boston, 2016

264

Johannine writings the strong term σφζω (slaughter) is used to refer to Cain’s fratricide (1 John
3 : 12), the crucified Christ (Rev 5 : 6) and Christian
martyrs (Rev 18 : 24).
References to homicide in the NT occur as commentary on the sixth commandment of the Decalogue, references to actual murders, and examples
of evil in vice lists, while it is also used metaphorical for the exploitation of others.
Unlike Israel in the HB/OT, the early Christian
movement had no legal jurisdiction and therefore
did not produce a specific corpus of criminal laws.
The punishment for committing homicide which
Matt 5 : 21 and Rev 21 : 8 anticipates is, e.g., not
performed by legal bodies, but by God at the last
judgment. The NT does, however, contain numerous references to the sixth commandment of the
Decalogue (Exod 20 : 13 [LXX 20 : 15]; Deut 5 : 17
[LXX 5 : 18]) which prohibits all transgression
against human life. Matthew 5 : 21–26 extends the
Mosaic teaching on homicide, which had apparently been interpreted as only being applicable to
criminal law (cf. Exod 21 : 12–14; Lev 24 : 17; Num
35 : 30–31), to include anger and acrimony. This
may be a deliberate echo of the story of Cain, but it
is important to note that anger is not only prohibited because it leads to murder. According to Jesus,
it is in itself deserving of condemnation. Every expression of human alienation and hostility towards
another, the outward act and the inward state, is to
be condemned as they are all the negation of the
love commandment. James 2 : 11 refers to the sixth
commandment in order to argue for the unity of
the law. As an expression of God’s will, any commandment like the one prohibiting murder that is
broken, violates his will as the lawgiver.
In the Gospel according to John, Jesus repeatedly accuses his enemies of plotting to kill him
(7 : 19; 8 : 37, 40). According to John, their intention
to murder Jesus was ultimately inspired by the Satan himself (13 : 2, 27) as it is he, and not Abraham
(8 : 44), who is their true father. The devil himself
is furthermore described as being a murderer from
the beginning ("νθρωποκτνος $ν "π% "ρχ'ς). This
could be a reference to either the fall narrative (Gen
3) or the first murder committed by Cain (Gen 4).
The devil is thus either the one who brought death
into the world through his seduction of Adam and
Eve, and who is therefore the murderer of all of
humanity, or the one who inspired the first murder
like he did the plot to murder Jesus. In 1 John
3 : 12–15 the link between the murder of Abel by
Cain, and the latter’s relationship to the evil one
((κ το πονηρο), is made explicit. Hating (μισ ω) a
brother is also equated with murdering him with
the result that neither would inherit eternal life.
In terms of actual homicides, Matt 23 : 30–35
refers to the persecution and murder of the OT prophets (cf. 1 Kgs 19 : 10, 14; Neh 9 : 26; Jer 2 : 30;
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26 : 20–24) in general and specifically to the murder
of Zechariah, son of Barachias, in the temple. This
is probably a reference to the priest Zechariah, who
was stoned after he had spoken prophetically in
2 Chr 24 : 20, since there is no extant tradition of
the prophet Zechariah being murdered in the temple. If the priest Zechariah is intended by Matthew
it could be that he is referring to the first (Abel) and
the final (Zechariah) murders mentioned in the OT
since 2 Chronicles was the last book in the HB. In
Mark 15 : 7 (par. Luke 23 : 19) φνος refers to murder committed by either Barabbas, or his followers.
Unlike the parallel in Luke 23 : 19–25 (and Acts
3 : 14), Mark does not clearly state that Barabbas
had personally committed murder. Acts 9 : 1 also
contains an idiom, “breathing murderous threats,”
that highlights Saul’s hostile attitude towards believers without necessary implying that he personally intended to murder them himself, although
Luke could have meant this or that Saul actively
participated in their sentencing to death (cf. Acts
26 : 10). The author of Hebrews includes murder by
the sword (Heb 11 : 37) in his lists of the various
ways in which believers had been persecuted in the
past. This could be a reference to killing of the prophet Uriah (Jer 26 : 23).
Numerous vice lists also mention murder. In
the Synoptics it appears in the vice catalogue of
Mark 7 : 21 (par. Matt 15 : 19) in which Jesus refers
to the evil thoughts that come from within a person
and which lead to deeds that defile them. Paul includes a reference to murder in his vice list in Rom
1 : 29 (as some textual witnesses of Gal 5 : 21 do).
For him murder, like all the other evils he refers to,
serve as proof of the degeneration of humankind
that has resulted from God handing them over to
their evil thoughts. First Timothy 1 : 9 lists the
murderers of fathers (πατρολ)*ας), mothers
(μητρολ)*ας), and murderers in general ("νδροφνος – man-slayer) as examples of those who have
no respect for the law. In 1 Pet 4 : 15 being punished
for committing murder is listed as an example of a
cause of suffering that is not commendable for believers.
The meaning of the reference to murder in Jas
4 : 2 remains a matter of debate. The key question
is whether it should be understood as referring to
Christians literally murdering each other (possibly
due to doctrinal differences or the desire for material gain) or figuratively as referring to the effect of
internal strife on the Christian community. In the
latter sense it functions as a hyperbole referring to
an attitude tantamount to murder, but without signifying the actual taking of a human life. James
thus refers to the conflicts (wars also being understood metaphorically) within the community that
result from the internal conflict and desires of each
member. Murder could also function as a metaphorical description of the exploitation of the poor
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as in Judaism. Ben Sira (34 : 22), e.g., depicts the
legal confiscation of the property of the poor as
murder. Similarly Jas 5 : 6 condemns the destructive
injustice of the rich and powerful against the oppressed and powerless poor as murder.
Bibliography: ■ Baltz, H., “φονεω,” EDNT 3 (Grand Rapids, Mich. 1994) 435–436. ■ Banks, R., Jesus and the Law in
the Synoptic Tradition (SNTSMS 28; Cambridge, 1975).
■ Betz, H. D., The Sermon on the Mount: A Commentary on the
Sermon on the Mount, including the Sermon on the Plain (Hermeneia; Minneapolis, Minn. 1995). ■ De Villiers, P. G. R./J. W.
Van Henten, Coping With Violence in the New Testament (STAR
16; Leiden 2012).

Marius Nel

III. Judaism
Second Temple Period ■ Rabbinic Judaism ■ Medieval
Judaism ■ Modern Judaism

■

A. Second Temple Period
There is no clear definition of homicide in the Second Temple period. Most likely the juridical definition and the casuistic application was a mix of biblical law together with Hellenistic, Roman, and the
earliest rabbinic traditions. During the late Second
Temple period, initially, Hellenistic penal codes,
and later, the Roman code, were applied in Judea,
even if the area benefited from an autonomous legal
status. Hellenistic-Roman legal influence in penal
legislation remained dominant even during Hasmonean and Herodian rule. And yet, it is more than
likely that there existed a penal legislation proper
to Judea. Therefore local courts of law could judge
cases of homicide, and apply, if necessary, the death
penalty. For example, it is known that the Sadducees possessed a Book of Decrees, or Sefer Gezerot,
which described the different forms of death penalty, which a court of law could impose, such as
stoning, burning, strangulation, and beheading
(MegTa 2 : 8). Yet, it seems that the punishment
commonly applied was hanging, or even crucifixion. According to the Temple Scroll, hanging was the
penalty applied in the case of treason (Temple Scroll,
column 54; 4 Pesher Nahum 1.6-8; Josephus, Ant.
13.380). Thus, in the Hasmonean and Herodian period, in which Judea enjoyed complete autonomy,
homicide comprised part of a penal law that fell to
the competence of local courts. First, there was the
royal court, or Herod’s Court, which Josephus also
calls the συν δριον or δικαστ,ριον. Members of the
royal family, συγγενες, and φλοι made up this
royal tribunal. To these Herod could add representatives of the Roman government. The only types of
cases, probably including homicide, brought to this
court were those involving the royal family (Josephus, Ant. 16.361–372; 17.89–98, and J.W. 1.538;
1.620–636). The popular assembly, or (κκλησα,
also functioned as a court, which could try common
citizens. The Sanhedrin’s jurisdiction in the case of
homicide covered only the atonement to be made
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in the case of anonymous murder, when a heifer’s
neck was broken (mSot 9 : 1). Moreover, in Hasmonean and Herodian Judea, Jewish cities such as Sepphoris or Jericho were ruled by the same συνεδρα,
probably the battei din mentioned in Tannaitic literature, that were established by Gabinius. According to the Mishnah, the battei din were small councils of twenty-three members (mSan 6) whose
function was to stand as the local courts of law. It
is significant that, according to the Mishnah, these
bodies had the right to pass sentences for capital
crimes (mSan 1 : 4). With respect to lower level
courts, Josephus wrote that in τοπαρχαι districts),
as well as in towns and villages, the main authority
was in the hands of seven appointed magistrates,
the seven elders, who formed the lowest court (Josephus, Ant. 4.214). These courts could also try criminal cases involving homicides. Possibly the upper
courts, which were dominated by Sadducees, the
ruling class of Judea, applied the death penalty
more easily as a way to intimidate the lower classes,
while lower courts, which included Pharisees, were
less eager to resort to the ultimate penalty. From
57 BCE until 44 BCE, as a consequence of Gabinius’intervention, it is probable that adjudicating
homicide was the competence of the συνεδρα or
σνοδοι, different and separate ruling bodies,
which functioned independently of one another
and which were also responsible for administering
penal law in the five juridical regions into which
the Hasmonean state was divided. These ruling
bodies were composed of the most important members of the local elites. Once Judea became subject
to Roman law, after 6 CE, homicide cases that involved a Roman citizen were judged by the Roman
governor of equestrian rank. From 6 to 41 CE, they
were the responsibility of the praefectus, and from
44 until 66 the procurator adjudicated them. In principle, the penalty for a homicide handed down by a
Roman court of law was crucifixion.
Bibliography: ■ Falk, Z. W., Introduction to Jewish Law of the
Second Commonwealth, vol. 2 (Leiden 1978). ■ Piattelli, D./
B. J. Jackson, “Jewish Law during the Second Temple Period,” in An Introduction to the History and Sources of Jewish Law
(ed. N. S. Hecht et al.; Oxford 1996) 19–56. ■ Rabello, A.
M., “Jewish and Roman Jurisdiction,” in An Introduction to
the History and Sources of Jewish Law (ed. N. S. Hecht et al.;
Oxford 1996) 141–58. ■ Rabello, A. M., “Civil Justice in
Palestine from 63 BCE to 70 CE,” in Classical Studies in Honor
of David Sohlberg (ed. R. Katzoff et al.; Ramat Gan 1996) 298–
99. ■ Rabello, A. M., “Herod’s Domestic Court? The Judgement of Death for Herod’s Sons,” JLA 10 (1992) 39–56; reprinted in id., The Jews in the Roman Empire: Legal Problems,
from Herod to Justinian (Variorum Collected Studies Series;
Aldershot 2000). ■ Safrai, Z., The Economy of Roman Palestine
(London 1994). [Esp. 53–54]

Samuele Rocca
B. Rabbinic Judaism
The prohibition against killing a human being (retsaḥ, “murder”; shefikhut damim – lit., “spilling
blood”) is considered by the rabbis to be one of the
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most basic and important of all biblical prohibitions. The rabbis deduce from the context of Abel’s
murder by Cain in Gen 4 that “man was created
singly to teach you that whoever destroys the life of
one Israelite is treated, by Scripture, as if he destroyed an entire world, and whoever sustains the
life of one Israelite is treated, by Scripture, as if he
sustained an entire world” (mSan 4 : 5). The first explicit homicide prohibition, in Gen 9 : 6 (“Whoever
sheds the blood of a human, by a human shall that
person’s blood be shed; for in his own image God
made humankind”), signifies: (1) its inclusion in
the rabbinic category of seven Noahide (universal)
laws, (2) the appropriate punishment (death), and
(3) its philosophical grounding. The legal prohibition against homicide applicable to Jews appears in
the Ten Commandments (Exod 20 : 13; Deut 5 : 17:
“You shall not kill”).
The prohibition against homicide includes a
ban on suicide. Along these lines, the rabbis dictate
that if one is given the choice of violating a Jewish
legal precept or being killed, one must save one’s
life and violate the prohibition (yaavor we-al yehareg, “transgress rather than be killed”). The primacy of the ban on homicide is demonstrated by
the fact that it is one of only three commandments
(along with idolatry and illicit sex acts) that demand that one “be killed rather than transgress”
(yehareg we-al yaavor). Thus, if one is ordered, at
the threat of death, to kill another person, one is
commanded to die rather than take another life.
The rabbis deem human reason (sevara) to be the
source of this rule; as Rabbah states in the Talmud,
under such circumstances, “rather than slaying another person you must allow yourself to be slain,
for who says your blood is redder? Perhaps his
blood is redder!” (bSan 74a–b). Concomitantly, the
rabbis deem it justified, if not mandatory, to kill
another person when necessary either (1) to save
one’s own life (e.g., allowing the homeowner to kill
a nighttime burglar, who is presumed to be prepared to murder the homeowner, bSan 72a) or (2)
to prevent someone from killing another person (or
committing rape; mSan 8 : 7). The latter rule includes the law of the pursuer (rodef), which states
that a bystander who witnesses someone chasing after someone to kill him has an obligation to stop
the pursuer, even by killing him if necessary. The
Mishnah elliptically states that the bystander must
kill the murderous pursuer in order to “save” him –
referring not to the person being chased but to the
erstwhile killer (mSan 8 : 7; bSan 73a).
1. Intentional Homicide. As noted above, the Bible proscribes death (decapitation by sword according to the rabbis, bSan 52b), as the punishment for
intentional homicide; there is no atonement for this
crime. The biblical text precludes the rabbis from
interpreting the principle of lex talionis in this context to mean financial remuneration in place of
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“like punishment” (as they do with respect to nonfatal injuries; see “Injury, Personal II. Judaism”),
stating explicitly that the life of a killer cannot be
redeemed by payment of a “ransom” (kofer; Num
35 : 31–32). By taking a life, the intentional killer
has forfeited his own; with that act, his life is understood, in the words of Maimonides, to have reverted to the ownership (kinyan) of God (MishT, Hil.
Rotseaḥ 1 : 4).
The Talmud implies that most rabbis were
troubled by the death penalty, stating that
a Sanhedrin [court] that puts a man to death once in
seven years is called a murderous one. R. Eleazar ben
Azariah says, “or even once in 70 years.” R. Tarfon and
R. Aqiva said, “If we had been in the Sanhedrin no
death sentence would ever have been imposed.”
(mMak 1 : 10)

The rabbis had no power to revoke the biblically
mandated death penalty. However, they created legal impediments that rendered its imposition extremely difficult, if not impossible (e.g., two witnesses viewing the event from the same vantage
point; immediately before he kills, the perpetrator
must be warned that this will be an act of murder
and will result in his death; the perpetrator must
acknowledge receipt of the warning). They did,
however, make provision for alternate forms of
punishment (which might indirectly result in
death; bSan 81b), and stated there would be divine
retribution (bSan 37b; bMak 10b; ySot 1 : 7) for those
convicted of intentional homicide but for whom the
death penalty, for procedural reasons (e.g., the absence of two witnesses), could not be imposed.
2. Unintentional Homicide. The Bible defines homicide based on the question of intent. Anyone
who commits an unintentional killing is to be exiled in order to atone therefore. The early rabbis
(tannaim) continued the biblical theme. They
parsed the actus reus of unintentional homicide, primarily in terms of questions of causation (e.g., can
the death be attributed to someone’s direct action;
the presence or absence of intervening factors, etc.;
see mMak 1 : 1, 2). However, the later rabbis (amoraim) developed new categories and principles relating to the question of mens rea. Rather than looking
at intent based upon objective indicators, as had
been done in the Bible and by the tannaim, the
amoraim focused on subjective evidence as to what
the specific perpetrator knew or should have known
about the wrongdoing of the act (thus the requirement of a warning). The amoraim introduced the
ideas that (1) differing degrees of negligence (and,
hence, of culpability) should be taken into account
in cases of unintentional homicide and (2) the role
of exile is punishment and protection from the
blood avenger rather than atonement. Specifically,
they recognized a new category of homicide known
as “unintentional but close to intentional” (shogeg
karov le-mezid; bMak 7b) which would have been re-
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garded as intentional by the tannaim. This would
include, e.g., a killer possessing the general intent
to perform the act, but lacking the specific intent
to murder that victim, such as someone who aims
at an animal and kills a human (bSan 9b). One who
kills this way receives neither the death penalty nor
forced exile, but the blood avenger is free to kill
him.
The homicide prohibition factors into contemporary debates. For example, abortion is not considered an act of homicide. (NB: in a rare deviation
from the norm, pursuant to which rules for Jews
are stricter than those for non-Jews, abortion by a
non-Jew is considered an act of homicide). Euthanasia, no matter what the circumstances, is prohibited
as killing. Homicide also plays a role in the issue
of organ donation. There is some debate about the
moment of death in Jewish law. Most rabbinic decisors have adopted brain death as the definition, but
some adhere to the traditional definition of cardiac
death. On that minority view, the homicide prohibition effectively precludes the possibility of postmortem organ donation.
Bibliography: ■ Albeck, S., Introduction to Jewish Law in Tal■ Elon, M., The
mudic Times (Ramat-Gan 1999). [Heb.]
Principles of Jewish Law (Jerusalem 1975). ■ Greengus, S.,
Laws in the Bible and in Early Rabbinic Collections (Eugene,
Oreg. 2011). ■ Shemesh, A., “The Murderer’s Banishment:
Tannaitic Sources and Amoraic Interpretations of the Second Chapter of Tractate Makkot” (MA diss., Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan 1988). [Heb].

Madeline Kochen
C. Medieval Judaism
1. “You shall not murder” – Contrasting Definitions. Maimonides (1138–1204), in his Book of Commandments (Sefer ha-Mitswot, 289th negative commandment) codifies the obvious: “You shall not
murder” (Exod 20 : 13) is an explicit prohibition
against humans murdering one another; the transgression of this negative commandment incurs
death by decapitation. The anonymously authored
Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh (34th commandment) phrases the
duty fundamentally differently and rephrases the
rule as, “Do not kill the innocent,” insisting that
the prohibition against murder does not apply to
those who are not “innocent.” These contrasting
formulations of the obligation to not kill – is it a
duty not to kill anyone or a duty not to kill the
innocent? – is one of the central issues in the formulation of the prohibition in the medieval period.
The vast majority of medieval Jewish legists
adopted Maimonides codification, with only a small
minority formulating the rule any other way.
2. Intentional vs. Unintentional Homicide. The
central violation was intentional homicide. Manslaughter was a lesser violation and subject to an
alternative legal rubric not discussed in this entry.
The legal calculus necessary to determine the judgment of a murderer utilizes numerous variables –
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Amoraic Category of
Homicide

Perpetrator’s Level of
Knowledge
(or Negligence)

Punishment

Example: One who throws a
rock thrown into a public
place and kills someone
(bBQ 35b)

Mezid
(intentional)

Knows the act is illegal
and knows the punishment

Death by sword

[Purposefully kill the victim;
two witnesses, warning, etc.]

Shogeg qarov le-mezid
(unintentional close to intentional)

Knows the act might be illegal (should have checked)

(No death penalty or exile,
but) possible death by the
blood avenger or “at the
hands of heaven”

In a public space where many
people go

Shogeg
(unintentional)

Should have known the act
might be illegal

Exile to City of Refuge

In a public space where people
occasionally go

Ones
(not responsible)

Not expected to have
known the act was illegal

Exempt from punishment

In a public space where people
do not usually go

Amoraic typology of types of homicide

foremost, determining whether the murder was intentional or unintentional. Maimonides (MishT,
Laws of Murderers and the Protection of Life 1.1–7 and
6.5) lists two conditions that must be met in order
for the murderer to be subject to capital punishment: the murder must have been witnessed in toto
by at least two witnesses, and the murderer must
have been warned and must have acknowledged his
awareness that his action would result in the murder of this individual.
Cases involving less than two witnesses or without this warning and acknowledgment were never
punished by the Jewish courts, but were subject instead to punishment by the courts of the (Jewish
or Gentile) kings. Arnold Enker understands that
homicide’s legal consequences are determined by
two distinct relationships: between God and human
beings, and between human beings themselves. The
violation of the former relationship is the central
one discussed by the Torah and the talmudic rabbis.
This violation is, at the discretion of the religious
courts, punishable by death, and the ultimate purpose of the punishment is to protect the sanctity of
God and God’s relationship to humankind. Many
medieval authorities claim this punishment was
never carried out in all of Jewish history. The latter
relationship is at the discretion of either the king
or his courts which aim to enforce the law in order
to preserve social order (Enker: 1137). Even in talmudic times, since the formal procedure for executions by rabbinical courts was non-functional, there
was a justice system in place that executed murderers that the Talmud designates by placing them in
a kippah (cell) and feeding them barley until they
die (bSan 79b; mSan 9 : 5). Since there was a nonfunctional formal legal system, supervised by the
Sanhedrin, a justice system was necessary to punish
murderers. Consequently, the rabbinical courts exercised de facto jurisdiction to punish murderers,
including the use of the death penalty, although,
not in the formal sense of the four talmudic penalties.
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3. The Duty to Kill the Pursuer. There are two
major exceptions to the commandment “Thou shall
not murder.” They are the unique duties to kill the
pursuer and the right to kill in self-defense. Maimonides, in his Book of Commandments (Sefer ha-Mitswot, 247th positive commandment and 293rd negative commandment) defines two commandments in
Deut 25 : 11–12 (see SifDev Deut 25), that relate to
an innocent person being threatened by another
person. Someone else may, if necessary, kill the pursuer in order to save the life of the innocent person – albeit, it is preferable to disarm or maim the
pursuer. Consistent with Maimonides’ general rule
to always prohibit murder, he later codifies (MishT,
Laws of Murderers and the Protection of Life 1.5–9) that,
when a person is captured after committing a homicide, neither witnesses of the murder nor anyone
who later sees the murderer may kill him until he
is brought before a court and sentenced to death.
Not only may one kill the pursuer in order to save
an innocent life, but one may also kill in defense of
one’s own life. Furthermore, Maimonides (MishT,
Laws of Theft) codifies that one may kill a thief who
is trespassing in one’s home in order to steal; despite the intruder’s intention only to steal, Jewish
law assumes that the thief would kill if confronted,
thus allowing the homeowner to kill in self-defense. A fortiori, one is allowed to defend oneself in
public when being pursued by someone who has a
clear intent to kill. It is a logical reading of classical
Jewish law that one may kill a pursuer who has no
intent to actually murder so long as their conduct
could actually lead to the death of the one being
pursued (see “Abortion”).
4. Determining When Life Begins and Ends:
Killing a Fetus and a Dying Person. The general
prohibition, “You shall not murder,” pertains to
healthy and functioning humans. Nevertheless,
some discussion is necessary to understand to what
extent this prohibition protects people who are
either just beginning their lives or beginning to die.
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There is a dispute in the medieval Jewish tradition as to whether feticide is murder. The famous
French biblical and talmudic exegete Rashi (R. Solomon Yitsḥaqi, on bSan 72b s.v. yatsa rosho) notes
simply that a fetus is not a person “until its head
is out of the mother’s womb,” justifying abortion
without any mention of the homicide prohibition.
Most medieval decisors adopted Rashi’s formulation. Maimonides (MishT, Laws of Murderers and the
Protection of Life 1.9), on the other hand, seems to be
of the view that abortion is murder as he cites the
talmudic rule (bSan 72b citing mOhal 6 : 6) permitting abortion only because the fetus is an unintentional pursuer, indicating that feticide is permitted
only when the mother’s life is in danger.
Just as there is discussion concerning a fetus –
at the beginning of life – so too is there discussion
concerning when life begins to end. The Talmud
(bSan 78a; bMak 7a) seems to rule unambiguously
that anyone who murders a mortally wounded person is not liable for capital murder (i.e., cannot be
punished, even though a sin has occurred). Indeed,
one talmudic view proposes that no one should ever
be judicially executed since the judges can always
ask the witnesses in a homicide case whether they
had checked if the victim was mortally wounded
prior to the homicide, casting doubt on whether the
victim was healthy or mortally wounded. Maimonides (MishT, Laws of Murderers and the Protection of Life
2.7) codifies that one who kills a mortally wounded
person has committed homicide but is exempt from
capital punishment. This perhaps contrasts with
the view of some that a dying person – goses – is
legally already like a dead person (see Rashi on bQid
78b s.v. keshehu goses, and Arbaah Turim, YD 370).
5. The Application of these Laws to Noahides.
Jewish law recognizes that homicide is a violation
of the universal law code that governs all people
and that neither a Jew nor a Gentile may kill. However Jewish law in the area of homicide, as in many
other areas, simplifies the law as it pertains to Noahides, eliminating all the exceptions pertaining to
Jews. Maimonides (MishT, Laws of Kings and Wars
9.4) codifies that a Gentile is liable and may be executed for the murder of a pursuer who may have
been stopped with less than deadly force, the murder of any fetus, or the murder of one who is mortally wounded and without remedy.
Bibliography: ■ Chavel, C. B. (ed.), Sefer ha-H
̣ innukh [Book
of Education] (Jerusalem 1961). ■ Cohn, H./M. Elon, “Homicide,” EncJud 9 (Detroit, Mich. 22007) 506–9. ■ Enker,
A., “Aspects of Interactions between the Torah Law, the
King’s Law, and the Noahide Law in Jewish Criminal Law,”
Cardozo Law Review 12 (1990–91) 1137–56. ■ Sulzberger,
M., The Ancient Hebrew Law of Homicide (Philadelphia, Pa.
1915).
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D. Modern Judaism
For Jews, the 20th century was one of unprecedented violence. Throughout the century and into
the 21st century, homicide has been a topic of intense Jewish interest.
In the safety of late Victorian England, Claude
Montefiore (1858–1938) thought that the sixth
commandment was one that his readers “would not
feel the least temptation” to violate, and that did
not demand much commentary. He made only one
distinction: warfare, he remarks, however barbarous it may be, is not prohibited by the commandment (1 : 92).
A few years later (1903), the murder of children
moved the Hebrew poet H
 aim Naḥman Bialik
nearly to despair of God, justice, and mercy. In “On
the Slaughter,” one of a series of poems on the Kishinev pogrom, Bialik echoes Gideon’s doubting
questions in Judg 6.
Montefiore was a stern critic of Jewish prejudice, but some modern Jews have regarded murder
as mainly a non-Jewish crime (Zborowski/Herzog:
149). “The hands are the hands of Esau” (Gen
27 : 22) is often quoted. “In the whole Christian
world,” wrote Franz Rosenzweig, “the Jew is practically the only human being who cannot take war
seriously, and this makes him the only genuine pacifist” (331).
But many modern Jews, including both Zionists
and liberals, have rejected the notion that Jews
should not take war seriously. “The People of the
Book…,” said Tsevi Yehudah Kook in Palestine in
1948, “cannot be … exempt from the sword”
(quoted in Blau: 175). Twenty years later, Israeli soldiers debated the distinction between warfare and
murder, so clear to Montefiore in his time. “The
borderline between murder and killing in war is
very blurred,” one said (Shapira: 132).
Many ethical and halakhic issues involving homicide have been debated in this period. During the
Holocaust, Jews faced the dilemmas of choosing victims for the death camps. There has also been debate since the mid-20th century over the attitudes
of Judaism towards abortion, capital punishment,
and political violence and assassination. The biblical commandment, “You shall not stand by the
blood of your neighbor” (Lev 19 : 16) has been interpreted both as a rule governing Jewish medical ethics and as a call to political action.
Recent halakhic discussions focus on end-of-life
issues in medical ethics, such as the termination of
medical care, as well as questions of suicide, physician assisted suicide, and euthanasia. Some liberal
interpreters of halakhah have argued for a permissive (and thus, in context, merciful) approach. However, centrist as well as Orthodox interpreters and
decisors have mostly argued for maintaining a strict
prohibition on suicide, and a fortiori on actions by
physicians to encourage patients to commit suicide.
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Refusing or witholding medical treatment, on the
other hand, as well as administering treatments
that may shorten the patient’s lifespan, admittedly
raise much more complex halakhic issues.
Montefiore was embarrassed by the violence in
the HB. He criticized the book of Esther for celebrating the massacre of the enemies of the Jews.
Other modern Jews have been drawn to the HB precisely on account of its violence. The HB, they feel,
depicts murderous humanity in its true colors.
Bibliography: ■ Blau, Y., “Plowshares into Swords: Contemporary Religious Zionists and Moral Constraints,” in
Jewish Studies in Violence (ed. R. R. Farber/S. Fishbane; Lanham, Md. 2007) 175–94. ■ Dorff, E./L. Newman (eds.), Contemporary Jewish Ethics and Morality: A Reader (New York/Oxford 1995). ■ Dorff, E., Matters of Life and Death: A Jewish
Approach to Modern Medical Ethics (Philadelphia, Pa. 1998).
■ Eisen, R., The Peace and Violence of Judaism: from the Bible to
Modern Zionism (New York 2011). ■ Hurwitz, P. et al. (eds.),
Jewish Ethics and the Care of End-of-life Patients (Jersey City, N.J.
2006). ■ Kaplan, K.J./M.B. Schwartz (eds.), Jewish Approaches
to Suicide, Martyrdom, and Euthanasia (Northvale, N.J. 1998).
■ Montefiore, C., The Bible for Home Reading, 2 vols. (London
1907). ■ Rosenbaum, I., The Holocaust and Halakhah (New
York 1976). ■ Rosenzweig, F., The Star of Redemption (New
York 1971); trans. of id., Der Stern der Erlösung (Frankfurt
a.M. 1921). ■ Shapira, A., Land and Power: the Zionist Resort
to Force, 1881–1948 (New York 1992); trans. of id., H
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(ed.), The Seventh Day: Soldiers’ Talk about the Six-Day War (New
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York 1952).

Joseph Davis

IV. Christianity
Throughout the history of Christianity, homicide
has been regarded as contrary to the Christian faith.
It is considered in continuity with the Jewish tradition and serves as the counterpart to the most important positive value of Christian ethics, namely
the right to life.
The term “homicide,” from homo (human) and
caedere (to slay) is strictly related to the killing of
human beings. The prohibition does not function
as an absolute norm; rather, it functions differently
in different kinds and different contexts of “killing.” The prohibition is either specified as the private killing of the innocent human being, which is
always prohibited, or as the private or public killing
of the non-innocent, which is justified under specific conditions. The tension between innocent/
non-innocent victims of homicide, and private and
public killing is the topic of Christian reflections
throughout its history.
For the early church up to the 4th century, homicide is unanimously regarded as a grave sin and
against the faith of Christians. The gospel’s confirmation of the Decalogue (Mark 10 : 19 et al.), together with its ethics of love, articulated as love of
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God, love of one’s neighbor, oneself (Matt 22 : 36–
40 et al.), and one’s enemy (Matt 5 : 44; Luke 6 : 35–
36), form the basis of Christian ethics. With respect
to the Christian response to state-authorized killing
of perpetrators or aggressors, Paul’s Letter to the
Romans is emphasized, calling for Christians’ obedience to the legal institutions (Rom 13 : 1–7). Since
capital punishment, abortion, infanticide, and killing for adultery were well-established practices in
ancient Rome, and persecution of Christians an experience witnessed frequently by the first communities, the prohibition of homicide became an important element of the overall shaping of the early
Church.
The first document beyond the biblical literature that addresses homicide is the Didache (ca. 100
CE). It states what will become the central doctrine
of Christian ethics: “you shall not commit murder,
you shall not commit adultery, … you shall not
murder a child by abortion nor commit infanticide.” (quote Sider: 18) More difficult is the interpretation of killing in self-defense, which is permitted, capital punishment by state authority, and
military service that may involve the killing of a
human being. Up to the 4th century, the church
fathers rule out Christian participation in public offices involving capital punishment. Christians, it is
commonly held, must also abandon the military
service. At the dawn of the Constantinian age, Lactantius adds to this the overall prohibition for
Christians to engage in war.
The ongoing discussion among theologians
about the pacifism of early Christianity is put to
rest with respect to Augustine: he is the first church
father who explicitly distinguishes between the unjustified killing of an innocent as an absolute norm,
including suicide, and the justified exception from
the prohibition when authorized by the state, in the
case of capital punishment (Brugger), and in war,
if that is “just,” i.e., meeting specific criteria (Civ.
19.7, 15).
The medieval Christian church is characterized
by continuity with the early church on the topic of
private homicide but discontinuity on the participation in public offices, including capital punishment
and military service, which is now generally permitted for Christians, too. Furthermore, “state authority” is now paralleled in “church authority,” which
may defend the community of the faithful against
internal and external enemies.
The most important systematic treatment of homicide is presented by Thomas Aquinas (1225–
1274; Thomas Aquinas: 64 [Summa Theologiae II/2]).
The arguments Thomas presents serve as the normative reference up to today, and will be explained
below in the context of the contemporary discourses.
Since human life is considered the foundational
value of Christian morality, specifications at present
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concern the question of abortion, suicide, and euthanasia. In all three areas, the moral principle has
been contested, although for the most part of the
history the debate has centered on suicide.
Suicide: Thomas Aquinas argues that while suicide is against human nature, it also violates the
principle of justice and love; the argumentation is
therefore not based entirely on the natural inclination to preserve one’s life but rather on the moral
reasoning to act in accordance with the good, together with the theological imperative of self-love.
The most complex reasoning on suicide is presented by Franciso di Vittorio (1486?–1546; di Vittorio).
Abortion: Abortion is treated for the most part
of the Christian history together with infanticide.
However, it was only in the 19th century, with the
discovery of the ovum, that the beginning of human life was considered to coincide with conception (Haker). Pope John Paul II called abortion, as
specific kind of killing the innocent, one of the
gravest sins in modern societies, not only affecting
the individual but also rooted in modern culture as
a structural sin (John Paul II 1995).
As is the case in public killings by authorities,
in penal systems and in war, some cases of private
killing call for specifications. Traditionally, these
are self-defense (killing of another person) and martyrdom (non-resistance to being killed). They are either
considered as exceptions or as cases that render the
killing justified, hence not included in the prohibition of homicide. In self-defense, the death of another person is neither the first intention (or any
intention) but a side-effect of self-protection, addressed as action with double effect; the death of a
martyr is not comparable to a suicide, because one’s
death is accepted in view of a greater good,
namely God.
With respect to the killing of non-innocent human
beings by (state or church) authorities, Christian ethics
today argues generally against the justification of
the death penalty (the Catholic Church not ruling it
out in principle but practically (John Paul II 1997),
and it has developed extended reasoning and criteria of just war.
In view of the Catholic Church’s doctrinal teaching on bioethical questions, Christian theologians
at present continue to debate the implication of the
prohibition of homicide (Wolbert). The debate
within bioethics is centered around (1) abortion –
especially in the case of conflicts between the life of
the mother and the child’s life, but also in the case
of rape. Theologians have questioned, too, the
moral status of the early embryo. In the case of (2)
euthanasia, the discussion is more in flux in so far
as different sub-categories need to be addressed: assisted suicide, indirect euthanasia (which may or
may not fall under the category of “double effect”
actions), and direct euthanasia, i.e., the active and
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intentional killing of an innocent person who
wishes to die. Yet another area of debate is the (3)
removal of organs for transplantation in the process
of dying or after (brain) death, as the exact ending
of life is contested.
In political ethics, the debate has shifted from
the death penalty to structural injustices (Gutierrez),
and theologians have addressed questions of “killing by omission.”
The theological tradition shows overall consistency in the prohibition of homicide, but it also reveals the historical conditions that have shaped the
criteria of unjustified and justified killing. It remains to be seen whether the 21st century will pursue its emphasis on killing in the context of bioethics, or whether it will shift (back) to the context of
political and institutional actions. The integration
of these structural questions have changed the perception of the prohibition to kill, even though the
metaphor of a “killing economy” (Pope Francis,
Evangelii Gaudium) goes far beyond the traditional
approach to homicide.
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Hille Haker

V. Islam
In Arabic there is no specific verb to denote “to
murder” and it can only be referred to using the
generic verb qatala (to kill), with the qualification of
“killing when it is unlawful” (cf. S 5 : 32). However,
there are a number of circumstances in which killing is acceptable or encouraged, such as war (cf.
S 2 : 190–91). The capital punishment for murder
imposed in the Bible (e.g., Num 25 : 16–21; Peters:
36–53) is also found in Islam, but the Qurān encourages any relative(s) of the victim to claim the
diya, compensation or “blood money” (S 2 : 178; Ibn
Rushd 2 : 478–505; Anderson). Murder, as the sixth
commandment (Exod 20 : 13), is often mentioned in
summaries of the Decalogue in the Bible (e.g., Hos
6 : 9; Rom 1 : 29; S 25 : 68), and is regarded as the
depth of depravity (1 John 3 : 12). This is also the
case in the Qurān, where homicide is punished
with condemnation to hell (S 4 : 93).
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Murder is seen in Islam as human interference
with the divine prerogative to cause death. As in
biblical thought, the murder of a human, who is
created in the “image of God” (cf. Gen 1 : 26–27), is
equated with an attack against God. In contemporary Islam this has led to debate about such matters
as euthanasia and abortion, in which ideas such as
the right to a “good death” are placed alongside
injunctions against murder (Brockopp: 177–93;
Bowen: 55–59). Rules and regulations about homicide in the Qurān and Islamic law, as well as more
ethical reflections on murder, both medieval and
modern, can be seen as largely maintaining the biblical injunction against homicide.
Bibliography. Primary: ■ Ibn Rushd, The Distinguished Jurist’s Primer: Bidāyat al-Mujtahid, 2 vols. (trans. I. A. Khan
Nyazee; Reading 1996).
Secondary: ■ Anderson, J. N. D., “Homicide in Islamic
Law,” BSOAS 13.4 (1952) 811–28. ■ Bowen, D. L., “Contemporary Muslim Ethics of Abortion,” in Islamic Ethics of
Life: Abortion, War, and Euthanasia (ed. J. E. Brockopp; Columbia, S.C. 2003) 51–80. ■ Brockopp, J. E., “The ‘Good Death’
in Islamic Theology and Law,” in Islamic Ethics of Life: Abortion, War, and Euthanasia (ed. id.; Columbia, S.C. 2003) 177–
93. ■ Peters, R., Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: Theory
and Practice from the Sixteenth to the Twenty-first Century (Cambridge 2005).

Stephen Burge

VI. Literature
The biblical traditions positively brim with homicides that have inspired a plethora of literary engagements. One particular homicide that is the subject of many such engagements is Cain’s fratricide
of his brother Abel (Gen 4); interestingly though,
we encounter a number of very different portrayals
of both the murderer and his motives for murder
within the literary retellings of this tradition. For
example, within a number of these retellings, the
name Cain serves as a byword for the treacherous,
homicidal, and monstrous potential of humanity.
In the Old English poem Beowulf, e.g., Cain is identified as the ancestor of cannibalistic predator Grendel; Cain’s initial act of fratricide rendered him
monstrous and his descendants are thus destined to
perpetuate both this monstrousness and the violent
legacy it endows. Meanwhile, in the medieval Wakefield Mystery Plays, Cain is portrayed in a similarly
negative light; he is hot-tempered, morally lacking,
and decidedly half-hearted in his devotion to God.
This association of Cain’s character with sinfulness and violence is likewise echoed in John Milton’s retelling of the story in Paradise Lost, where
Cain’s inferior sacrifice and lacklustre piety cause
the deity to favor Abel’s offering, thereby sparking
events that lead to the homicidal act. Yet, for Milton, this act is not without its meaning; reading the
narrative typologically, he transforms Abel into an
early anticipation of the sacrificial lamb, thereby
imbuing Cain’s murder with a sense of purpose, in
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its promise of atonement and its highlighting of
God’s salvific grace through Christ.
Shedding a different light on matters, Lord Byron’s drama Cain (1821) reimagines this biblical homicide as the stage upon which Cain plays out his
struggle to understand the divine mystery. Here,
Cain is something of a Byronic hero – a rebel with
a cause – consumed with a fury against the injustices of life east of Eden and a God he regards as
tyrannical and capricious. Abel thus becomes the
“collatoral damage” to his brother’s rage, killed
(perhaps inadvertently) as Cain reacts to the deity’s
seeming arbitrary rejection of his sacrifice. Such a
portrayal of Cain as a man impelled to violence by
external influences rather than any inherent propensity to evil is likewise explored in Salomon
Gessner’s epic poem Der Tod Abels (The Death of
Abel, 1760), and in Charles Baudelaire’s poem
“Abel et Caïn,” (1857) which invites the reader to
consider Cain and his descendents as the victims
of perpetual oppression and divine injustice, who
deserve our sympathy rather than censure. Following this line of thought, in John Steinbeck’s East of
Eden (1952), the character Lee interprets Cain’s act
of homicide as the inevitable outcome of his craving
for love and recognition, which are withheld from
him by both his parents and his God. This, explains
Lee, is “the story of mankind” – the crucial explanation for humanity’s propensity to violence (Steinbeck: 329).
These varied and sometimes ambivalent responses to Cain’s act of homicide are also echoed
in literary retellings of another scriptural murder –
Judith’s beheading of Assyrian military leader, Holofernes (Jdt 13). Many of the earlier engagements
with this Apocryphal tradition, including Guillaume de Salluste Du Bartas’s La Judit (1574), Gabrielle de Coignard’s Imitation de la victoire de Judich
(1594), and Marko Marulić’s Judita (1501), portray
the murderous Judith as a brave and virtuous warrior, driven in her homicidal intent by a political
and religious zeal that was laudable in its intensity.
Within these traditions, she symbolizes heroism in
the face of tyranny – a figure of hope during contemporary times of political, religious, and military unrest.
This positive portrayal of Judith gradually
changes, however, in later literary treatments, as
she becomes an increasingly sexualized and morally
ambivalent figure, a femme fatale who wields her
sexuality like a lethal weapon and casts off her
widow’s chastity in the pursuit of her murderous
goals. In the works by Friedrich Hebbel (Judith: Eine
Tragödie in fünf Akten, 1840), Jean Giraudoux (Judith,
1931), Michel Leiris (L’age d’homme, 1939), and Howard Barker (Judith: A Parting from the Body, 1990), Judith’s feelings towards Holofornes are marked by a
dangerous desire and it is this – rather than any
political or religious motivations – that ultimately
prompts her homicidal act.
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Another biblical murderer often likened to Judith is Jael, who similarly uses both duplicity and
feminine charm to destroy an enemy of Israel (Judg
4–5). Yet, Jael’s homicidal impulses are less often
referenced as a marker of woman’s dangerousness;
instead, her story is used as a motif to explore issues
of gender relations within the author’s own cultural milieu. In Sarah Maitland’s Daughter of Jerusalem (1978), for example, Jael’s murder of Sisera becomes a justifiable act of vengeance against all male
perpetrators of sexual violence, while for Charlotte
Brontë’s heroine Lucy Snowe in the novel Villette
(1853), both Jael and her victim come to represent
the experiences of women who were living within
the repressive strictures that 19th century societal
ideals imposed upon them.
Lastly, it is worth recalling that some biblical
homicides are carried out in the name of religious
obedience or justice, the murderer(s) confident that
the deed will meet with divine approval. No one
weeps for homicide victims such as the idolatrous
and duplicitous queen Jezebel (2 Kgs 9 : 30–37), the
incestuous rapist Amnon (2 Sam 13), or the myriad
victims of Israel’s devotional acts of genocide carried out after military victory (Deut 20 : 16–17;
1 Sam 15). Yet, there is one victim of holy homicide
whose death is often lamented in the scores of literary retellings that allude to her – the unnamed
daughter of Jephthah, sacrificed by her own father
after his rash vow to the deity went terribly wrong
(Judg 11: 29–40). And, while sympathies are usually
reserved for this woman, there may also be some
pity for her filicidal father. In Amos Oz’s short
story, “Upon this Evil Earth” (1965), e.g., Jephthah’s tragedy is that he is driven to fulfill his vow
out of love and loyalty to God – a God he fervently
believes can intervene and save his daughter, just
as this same God saved Isaac from Abraham’s sacrificial knife (Gen 22). The real heartbreak comes
when this does not occur, and what seems to be an
utterly unjust act of homicide is perpetrated, apparently, with divine approval.
Bibliography: ■ Coignard, G. de, “Gabriel de Coignard:
‘Imitation de la victoire de Judich’ (1594),” in Writings by
Pre-Revolutionary French Women (ed. A. R. Larsen/C. H. Winn;
New York/London 2000) 171–211. ■ Du Bartas, G. de Saluste, La Judit (Toulouse 1970). ■ Oz, A., Where the Jackals
Howl, and Other Stories (New York 1981). ■ Wakefield Mystery
Plays (ed. M. Rose; New York 1961).

Caroline Blyth

VII. Film
Homicide, both deeply fascinating and disturbing,
was a topic in film from its earliest years. The biblical distinction between murder/manslaughter and
“lawful” killing (cf. Exod 21 : 12–20; Num 35 : 17–
21; Deut 27 : 24 and the commandments in Exod
20 : 13 and Deut 5 : 17) was important throughout
film history. In the first decades of movies, for example, King John (dir. Walter Dando, 1899, UK) rec-
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reated the death scene of the poisoned king in
Shakespeare’s play; Anaíc ou Le balafré (dir. Georges
Méliès, 1908, FR) shows that three villains who –
amongst other crimes they commit – stab a man to
death are brought to justice; Man’s Genesis (dir. David W. Griffith, 1912, US) describes the invention
of primitive weapons to enable the righteous weak
to defeat the ruthless strong. Basically, before
World War I, the confrontation between good and
bad and the unquestioned victory of the good was
the dominating narrative of movie plots.
After World War II, probably due to the immense death toll on the one hand and the shoah
on the other, a notably different depiction of death
appeared first in Europe with its tradition of independent cinema but afterwards in the US too. The
staged “beauty” of death that had been a common
aesthetic approach showing the homicide victim
dying fast, easy, and dramatic, changed to a more
realistic picture of the pain, suffering, and agony of
the doomed characters, even in movies closely related to biblical movies. Comparing Ben-Hur (dir.
William Wyler, 1959, US) with Pale Rider (dir. Clint
Eastwood, 1985, US) and Der neunte Tag (dir. Volker
von Schlöndorff, 2004, DE, The Ninth Day), the
modified aesthetic concept is perfectly obvious.
What also changed was the depiction of death
penalty. Mostly unquestioned in film before the
1970s, except the topic of judicial errors, its ethical
implications became increasingly popular in the
last decades. Dead Man Walking (dir. Tim Robbins,
1995, US) and The Green Mile (dir. Frank Darabont,
1999, US), both films that cite or allude to biblical
texts, are examples of this trend. However, the
most outstanding film on this topic is Krótki film o
zabijaniu (dir. Krzysztof Kieslowski, 1988, PL, A
Short Film about Killing), which also aired as an episode of the Dekalog television series. Kieslowski’s
camera follows a young man who brutally murders
a taxi driver and is captured and executed afterwards – a simple plot but an incredibly touching
comparison between the two acts of killing. The almost documentary style of the movie provides the
formal framework for the thought provoking question about the individual dignity of both victim
and perpetrator.
It is obvious that depicting homicide is deeply
interwoven with socio-cultural reference systems,
which are, in western society, to a considerable extent still depending on the Bible. However, Rene
Girard tried to show that mimetic rivalry and the
scapegoat mechanism are responsible for the treatment of the victim, which in that case is at the same
time a sacrifice too. The act of homicide, especially
of “lawful” and/or “justified” killing, in film is often performed on subjects that are presented to the
audience as if they deserved it – the villain commits
crimes so substantial that the hero is supported by
the audience’s feelings when killing him. Yet this
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is exactly the way the scapegoat mechanism works
according to Girard.
Bibliography: ■ Brüne, K. (ed.), Lexikon des internationalen
Film (Reinbek 1991). ■ Coates, P. (ed.), Lucid Dreams: The
Films of Krzysztof Kieslowski (Trowbridge 1999). ■ Deacy, C./
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Theology and Film (FilTh 18; Marburg 2013). ■ Girard, R.,
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Judaism
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I. Judaism
Claims for the presence of homilies in the talmudic
literature of the first six centuries CE are contested.
Leopold Zunz, Abraham Geiger and most recently
Joseph Heinemann held that the classical rabbinic
midrashim “drew the bulk of their material from
the tens of thousands of sermons which had actually been preached in the synagogues of Palestine
during the first four or five centuries C.E.” (Heinemann 2006: 468–69). Because midrashic literature
is primarily comprised of short interpretative statements attached to words or phrases of Scripture and
looks nothing like orally delivered homilies, Heinemann argued that the midrash preserves only the
outlines of these homilies, whether of entire sermons or, more frequently, of short sections alone.
The midrashic literature, in this theory, was created
when small sections of orally delivered homilies
were compiled into larger units of discourse.
Heinemann points to two particular midrashic
forms as evidence that midrashic literature emerged
from orally delivered homilies. First are the
Tanḥuma-type midrashim, which use a rhetorical
formula that begins with the phrase “yelammedenu
rabbenu” (“let our master instruct us”), followed by
a legal question, the answer to which leads the “sermonizer” to an interpretation of the first verse of
the biblical lection read on a particular Sabbath.
The assumption is that the question posed was already known to the preacher, who used it as an anchor for his homily. The specific features that support the claim that this rhetorical form has its
origins in sermonic presentations are (1) the implied interaction of the speaker with an audience –
suggesting an oral context – and (2) the fact that
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these midrashim are generally associated with the
first verse of weekly Torah-readings.
A second relevant rhetorical form is the proem
(Aram. petiḥta). This literary form begins with the
citation of a biblical verse, usually from the Hagiographa, that seems unrelated to the topic of the Torah lection of the day. But in the course of elaborating on that citation, the exegete ultimately arrives
at the relevant verse. The proem thus sheds innovative and unexpected light on the meaning of a
weekly Torah portion, even as – by relating a verse
of the Hagiographa to one from the Torah or Prophets – it highlights the essential unity of all sections of Scripture. Scholars who argue for a public,
sermonic setting for the midrashic literature assume that the proem functioned as an introduction
to the Torah – or in some cases Haftarah – lection,
engaging the congregation’s interest by making
people wonder how the exegete would get from the
seemingly unrelated opening verse to the topic at
hand.
Recent scholarship challenges the claim that the
form and content of the midrashic literature as it is
preserved in the redacted documents before us reflect orally delivered homilies. The biggest obstacle
to accepting claims of the midrash’s origins in synagogue homilies is that the pericopae that comprise
the midrashic literature simply do not read like
anything that could have been delivered as a sermon. The redacted midrashic passages, even those
in the proems and Tanḥuma forms, tend to be short
and disjointed, commenting on specific verses
rather than unpacking larger themes or ideas in an
expository manner. Even an extremely knowledgeable lay congregation would find these texts too intellectually complex to be intelligible if presented
orally. Moreover, even if we could assume that the
midrash somehow emerged from originally oral
homilies, what we have before us is far too condensed and laconic to reflect in any significant way
what those sermons would have looked like.
Another challenge to the assumption that the
midrashic literature comprises highly redacted
forms of oral sermons arises from research of the
past decades that has significantly revised our understanding of the early rabbis, of their literary production, and of their place in the Jewish communities of the first six centuries CE. In the talmudic
period, the process of expositing biblical texts had
its primary locus within the rabbinic schoolhouse,
which – unlike the ancient synagogue – was under
the control of rabbinic masters. The talmudic literature itself provides little evidence that rabbis
preached in or even were principally involved with
synagogues; such preaching became associated with
the rabbinic estate only in the medieval period. This
means that, in the rabbinic period, “preaching,” if
it occurred at all, took place in the rabbinic academy, where it would have been aimed at other rabbinic masters and their disciples.
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